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ABSTRACT
This paper elaborates on the changes in corporate taxation in China to 
accommodate the government’s fiscal expenditure, specifically, the study 
highlights the effect of major corporate tax reforms in China on firms’ share 
price. The result shows that the price reactions are significantly positive/
negative to corporate tax rate decreases/increases, relatively related to 
different taxpayer categories. This finding is not in line with the theory 
of Modigliani and Miller (1958; 1963), which may be due to a larger tax 
benefit being gained from the tax cut. The correlations between price 
changes and three firm factors (risk, firm size, debt-equity ratio) among 
the groups are statistically significant, further validating the result. These 
findings add to the growing literature seeking to understand China’s 
capital market behaviour and also serves as a test of tax effect involving 
corporate tax.
Keywords: China tax reforms, corporate taxation, event study, market 
efficiency, tax policy. 
JEL Classification: H25, G14
Share Price Reaction on Corporate Tax Reforms in China
INTRODUCTION AND TAX POLICY CHANGES
In many countries, corporate tax income has contributed significantly towards the government’s 
total tax revenue. Corporate income could also be a sign of a good economy. It is theorised 
that corporate tax would increase the value of firms due to the value of the interest tax shield 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958; 1963). Nonetheless, past research has shown that an increase 
in the corporate tax rate may significantly stunt growth (Lee and Gordon, 2005). Therefore, a 
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lower corporate tax would support a better economy and also attract foreign investment into the 
country (Bellak and Leibrecht, 2009). Such a reduction in corporate tax has been promoted to 
attract more funds and stimulate economic growth (Djankov, 2017). There has been a worldwide 
trend to reduce corporate tax rates, especially in developed countries (Djankov, 2017). These 
countries include the UK (19% in 2017), Hungary (9% in 2017), Italy (24% in 2017) and 
Spain (25% in 2016). Developing countries, including Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand, are 
also reducing corporate tax rates to attract foreign investment flows to address the shortage of 
capital required for faster growth. The imposition of corporate taxation may have uncertain 
effects on the well-being of a nation. Thus, studies on tax policy demand attention. 
While some countries are focusing on offering more competitive corporate tax rates, it is 
also observed that those with simpler taxation systems have started to introduce corporate tax. 
In particular, tax reforms are observed in middle-eastern countries – Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
UAE and Saudi Arabia – some of which introduced corporate taxes to reduce their dependence 
on oil revenues. Oman and Qatar introduced corporate tax for their residents in 2010 (Selamat, 
Ariff, and Shamsher, 2015). Following suit, Kuwait has recently introduced a 15% corporate 
tax rate for firms with foreign ownership (Al-Arab, 2015; PWC, 2017). 
China took a similar action two decades earlier in the 1990s, imposing a major reform in 
its taxation system to meet the needs of the economy. These tax changes are major corporate 
events in an increasingly important market, where traditionally there has been no or little 
interest in corporate tax. The reforms were launched in China as ‘Li gai shui’ packages after 
careful studies to sell these ‘tax for profits’ reforms to the masses. 
Study of tax effects is important for several reasons. Due to mixed results, Fama (2011) 
argues that it remains unknown whether taxes affect market values in corporate finance. It is 
difficult to measure the impact of tax policies since the changes are usually ambiguous and 
may be subject to different interpretations (Graham, 2003; Doidge & Dyck, 2015). Using the 
event study method, the tax reform in China deserved to be investigated, mainly due to the 
significant size of its economy as well as its more mature capital market compared with other 
developing countries that are also revamping their corporate tax policies. China currently has 
one of the fastest growing major economies in the world, with an average growth of 7% for 
the past 10 years. 
Looking at the announcement dates, we report the analyses of price impacts in these three 
differing conditions: (1) the re-introduction of corporate tax, (2) an increasing corporate tax rate 
and (3) a decreasing corporate tax rate. In this paper, these three events1 are studied as part of 
the corporate tax reform in modern China, where the country underwent a massive change in its 
fiscal policy after opening itself for trade (Brean, 2013). It is possible to explore whether these 
tax changes had any effects on the share prices of these firms, provided that these companies 
are listed and data are available (China stock trading started in November 1990). The next 
section elaborates on historical corporate tax reforms in China and the importance of the events.
1 (i) implementation of corporate income tax in the year 1991 on local enterprises with foreign investment and foreign 
enterprises; (ii) implementation of income tax for China’s local enterprise in year 1994; and (iii) introduction of a uniform 
corporate income tax at 25 per cent effective from 2008, announced in 2007.
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The Changes of Corporate Tax in China
In this sub-section, we describe the evolution of the three major changes in China’s corporate 
tax. In a sense, these three tax law changes are major reforms of a major economy and are 
thus good examples for all developing markets. Understanding the background to the tax for 
profits reforms of China as a major fiscal policy exercise helps in understanding the influence 
on the value of firms when corporate taxes are suddenly introduced. This understanding makes 
it possible to predict and test the tax imposition effect on share values. 
As one of the oldest world civilizations, China has a long history of taxation (Louwe and 
Shaughnessy, 1999; Nakazato, 2011). Significant revisions were made to the country’s tax 
system during the economic reforms in the 1970s, just before the end of Mao Zhedong era, as 
the government sought to secure revenues prior to opening the door for foreign investments. The 
taxation system has undergone numerous reformations since then as the market economy has 
changed and the government has established roots—and more changes are likely in the future. 
In the early 1980s, the government focused on how to obtain revenue from income, 
which marks the start of the ‘Li gai shui’ or tax for profits reforms. An income tax on joint 
Chinese and foreign investment firms was imposed at a general tax rate of 30 per cent, on top 
of the local provincial tax rate of 10 per cent.2 Another tax law for wholly foreign enterprises 
was amended in 1982, with the tax rate ranging from 20 to 40 per cent. 3 Nevertheless, the 
government offered some incentives to foreign firms, which included tax exemptions during 
the first year of operation and a reduction of 50 per cent in the second and third years if they 
intended to continue operation for 10 years. Another reduction of 15 to 30 per cent would be 
applied over the next ten years, with the consent of the Ministry of Finance. Starting in 1983, 
state-owned enterprises were also taxed at a very high fixed rate of 55 per cent. Relative to 
the rates then prevalent in the developed and developing countries prior to scaling down the 
tax rates starting in 1980, China’s corporate tax rates up to 1983 were only on the high side 
with regard to local state-owned firms. Moreover, they remained on the high side relative to 
other countries until 1991. This could not be tested, however, as there was no organised stock 
exchange during these periods when corporate taxes were introduced.  
Nevertheless, this early reformation was not very successful. In their paper, Tsang and 
Cheng (1994) describe the problems that begged for attention as far back as 1986. The 
administration of tax was inefficient, given the fact that the actual amount of tax had always 
been subject to negotiations with authorities, both for state and foreign firms. Bahl and 
Wallich (1992) further note that the public service levels were lacking in all parts of China. 
Moreover, the state-owned enterprises, which previously had been a monopoly, were facing 
hard competition from newcomers. As a consequence, the incomes of these state enterprises 
plummeted, undercutting the actual tax received after negotiations, even though it was the 
main source of government income (Tsang & Cheng, 1994). These situations were made 
more complex by local tax authorities, which continued to offer preferential tax rates to firms 
operating within their jurisdictions to encourage local economic activities. As a result, the total 
tax revenues plummeted and fiscal budgets turned negative.
2 Details can be found in Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China concerning Joint Ventures using Chinese 
and Foreign Investment, adopted at the Third Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress and promulgated on 10 
September 1980.
3The Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China concerning Foreign Enterprise, which was adopted by the Fourth 
Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress and Promulgated on December 13, 1981.
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The government started to pay attention and increased its efforts to find new ways to fix 
the tax system. A newer version of income tax for foreign firms was adopted in 1991: the 
Enterprise Income Tax Law for foreign investment enterprise and foreign enterprise. 4 Despite 
a general tax rate of 33 per cent (both central and local tax), reduced rates were still widely 
available. A reduced rate of 24 per cent was usually granted if the firm established operations 
in a Special Economic Zone. A further reduced rate of 15 per cent was granted if the business 
was in a specific industry such as manufacturing or high technology. 
In 1994, the government launched another round of tax reforms (Lin, 2009). Tax policies 
were taken more seriously, specifying strict roles for local and central authorities. The 
government passed a general income tax on local Chinese firms, requiring them to pay a tax 
of 30 per cent, with an additional 3 per cent local tax. This new tax rate applied to all local 
Chinese firms, which included state-owned, collective, private, associated and joint-stock 
enterprises.5 While this was new for most firms, the rate represented a significant reduction 
for the state-owned firms, which were previously taxed at 55 per cent. Although tax revenues 
did not immediately increase from these reforms, they created a strong foundation for the 
economy in subsequent years (Lin, 2009). Indeed, China’s GDP has grown steadily in the range 
of 7 to 14 per cent per year (see Table A1 in Appendices) while tax revenues have increased 
progressively (World Bank, 2017).
As the economy was already in a steady state of prosperity, with the market economy 
model and the low currency rate sustaining high economic growth, the government took another 
bold step in 2007 to eliminate the differing tax rates between firms and ownership types.6 All 
corporate income would be subject to a flat tax rate of 25 per cent, both for local and foreign 
firms. Nevertheless, there were specific industries, such as high technology, that would still have 
a lower corporate tax rate (20 per cent). Further, small businesses would be granted a lower tax 
rate of 15 per cent. This change became effective in 2008, and as a result the foreign firms that 
had previously been charged a lower actual tax rate – recall the negotiated tax scheme – were 
subjected to a gradual tax increase over the ensuing five years.
It is possible to explore in this paper what effects these tax changes, which started in the 
modern day tax reform (stock trading started in 1991), had on the share prices of firms, provided 
that these companies are listed and data are available. The beginning stock exchange in 1991 
was very small and had few listed firms (less than 10 trading firms), which limits our analysis. 
However, by 2007, there was an abundance of listed firms, making it possible to observe the 
price effect in more detail while also taking advantage of the improvements in market efficiency, 
including more timely and accurate disclosures following the establishment of Shanghai Stock 
Exchange on November 1990.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The relevant but widely known literature 
on corporate taxation is briefly discussed in the next section. The hypotheses for testing and 
the methodology are explained in the section following. The reader will find a specification 
4 The Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises, 
adopted by the Fourth Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress and Promulgated by Order No. 45 of the President 
of the People’s Republic of China on April 9, 1991.
5 Provisional Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Enterprises Income Tax, adopted at the 12th General 
Meeting of the State Council held on 26th November, 1993
6 The Corporate Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted at the 5th Session of the 10th National 
People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on March 16 2007.
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of the paper’s well-established methodology, which includes a panel regression to take 
advantage of the latest and more accurate methodology. Next, the results are presented along 
with interpretation to help understand the theory-suggested behaviour of the share prices to 
these three reform laws and to determine whether they had significant effects on share values. 
Information efficiency tests reveal significant share price changes at the time the tax change 
laws were announced. Finally, the association of share price changes with three firm-specific 
variables – risk, firm size and debt-equity ratio (capital structure) – is demonstrated. The paper 
concludes in the final section.
LITERATURE ON TAXATION EFFECTS
Considerable research has been conducted in the field of taxation. Two classical works are those 
of Modigliani and Miller (1958; 1963), who argued that, in a perfect market where tax does 
not exist, the level of debt would have no impact on the value of a firm. They later developed 
another theory on how corporate tax would increase the value of a firm, which is the value of 
the tax shield of interest, τcD, through the tax deduction of interest costs by the firm. Therefore, 
the value of a levered firm would not be the same as the value of an unlevered firm:
(1)   VL = VU + τc D  
This theory implies that the firm reaches its maximum value when it obtains a 100 per cent 
debt. However, very high leverage would cause the firm distress and increase the likelihood of 
bankruptcy. Therefore, later research emerged about how corporations could maximize their 
value through different capital structure policies. One of the famous theories is the traditional 
trade off theory (the actual behaviour of the manager would be to raise cheaper financing 
by issuing debt rather than opting for more expensive funding), which suggests that there is 
an optimal point between the firm’s distress level (bankruptcy costs) and the benefit of the 
tax shield (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973). The argument of the debt-to-equity level has also 
been raised by Donaldson (1961), who initially suggested the scenario of pecking order.7  He 
theorised that it is common for firms to choose their financing terms based on priority order. 
That is, the firms would first seek internal financing before resorting to external financing 
methods (debt first and then equity).
Nonetheless, neoclassical economists would argue that reducing the corporate tax rate 
would lower the cost of capital and induce firm growth. Firms would be left with a greater 
supply of cash and have more opportunities for investment or more resources to funnel into 
growth projects. In other words, corporate taxation would reduce the investment that would 
have otherwise occurred (Lintner, 1955). In addition, decreasing corporate tax liability would 
further exacerbate cross-country profit shifting and base erosion (Haufler & Schjelderup, 2000; 
Devereux, Lockwood, & Redoano, 2008).   
The effect of taxation has also been investigated from the perspective of dividends 
subjected to tax. It has been observed that regular streams of dividends have no impact on the 
value of a firm (Miller and Modigliani, 1963), leading to the dividend irrelevancy proposition. 
7 This theory has been slightly modified by Myers and Majluf (1984).
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Moreover, the effect coming from dividends has been attributed to a signalling effect rather 
than the dividend effect per se. Brennan (1970) questioned that notion and expanded this theory 
by developing an after tax CAPM framework,8 whereby he analyses the effect of personal/
dividend taxation on the expected value of a firm. 
(2)  E(Rm - Rf)i = α1 βi + δ1Divi
Brennan’s study was replicated by Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979; 1980; 1982), with 
a slightly changed model. They claimed to find evidence of a clientele effect, as the implied tax 
rates in the coefficients for the dividend yields were related to the clienteles, as suggested by 
earlier researchers. Similar works have been done using different models and methodologies 
to look for dividend effects on firm value, although the results have been mixed (see Black 
and Scholes, 1974; Long, 1978; Poterba and Summers, 1984; Ariff, 1985; Chen, Grundy and 
Stambaugh, 1990; Naranjo, Nimalendran and Ryngaert, 1998; Fama and French, 1998; Gentry, 
Kemsley and Mayer, 2003 and several more).
Studies have also looked at the share price effect in the event of a tax announcement. 
Amromin, Harrison and Sharpe (2008) found an increase in share prices following the 
announcement of the United States dividend tax cut in 2003, although with low significance. 
The study indicates that high dividend portfolios outperformed low dividend portfolio following 
dividend tax reduction. Similarly, Selamat, Ariff, and Shamsher (2013) evidenced significant 
price increases following the decision to impose a single tier tax system in Malaysia, which 
resulted in tax-free dividend income. Currently, there are limited studies that have looked into 
the announcement of corporate taxation due to the complicated confounding effect (Doidge 
& Dyck, 2015). This paper would modestly attempt to shed light in this area and extend the 
literature on firm valuation.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data
This section aims to explain how the disclosure dates of tax reforms are identified before 
explaining the data sources and test models. There is a vast body of web-based and official 
publication sources for the many dates over which the reform details are discussed and released 
to the marketplace (see Table A2 in Appendices, which lists the dates in chronological order). 
The news about the events is collected from a number of sources. Because of the paucity of 
news coverage in English in some periods in print publications, especially during the early 
1990s, we find the dates from journal articles and some other sources, such as the Factiva 
database. These dates are then confirmed from the government law database website to validate 
the information. 
In order to make sense of slow releases of announcements with regard to which dates were 
more important than others, we resorted to first documenting all the announcements and then 
exploring how the stock market index reacted to the announcements on each of these dates. 
8 The after tax CAPM model was developed based on earlier framework of CAPM that is constructed by Farrar and Selwyn 
(1967). The CAPM was initially derived by works from Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966).
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The aim was to identify whether some news disclosures created more certainty that the reform 
package would be finalised. We found three dates on which news disclosures reached certainty 
of the laws being finalised: the announcement of passing of tax law, the date of law issuance 
and the date the law takes effect. All these were recorded since we were unsure when the 
information actually reached the public. Chui and Kwok (1998) reported that all information 
had to be vetted by the government before consent was given for the media to release it to the 
public. Therefore, we are quite certain that the information did not leak out before the law was 
confirmed in the meeting. We identify these events as the dates around which tests are to be 
conducted for sharing price reactions using individual stock abnormal returns. 
The data on share prices are collected from DataStream. We obtain the Shanghai adjusted 
market index prices and the firms’ capitalisation adjusted share prices. There are three common 
Chinese equity listing types, namely ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘H’ shares. The ‘A’ share is limited to purchase 
by local investors, the ‘B’ share is only for foreign investors and the ‘H’ share is freely traded 
by anyone, although it is only traded in Hong Kong. We exclude the ‘H’ share from the analysis 
since it is not listed in the Shanghai market. We would like to observe the difference between 
these two equity listing types since information may creep in faster for foreign investors due 
to the information barrier in China (Chui & Kwok, 1998). Therefore, the result for both types 
of equity will be noted for comparison.
Both market and individual firm’s share returns are calculated using the natural log of 
return, ln(Pt/Pt-1 ) as is well established; these values are then converted to percentages. 
Further, from the same database, we collect information about firms: standard deviation of 
stock returns over a 30-week period with daily data as a measure of stock risk, annual market 
capitalization for size variables and annual debt-to-equity ratio in the form of average debt-
equity over the year. The selection of sample in each period is based on the availability of data. 
Data are limited for events dated between 1991 and 1993, as not many firms were yet listed 
on the newly established Shanghai Exchange as of December 1990. Even the ‘B’ shares were 
first listed on the Shanghai Exchange in July 1992. Over time, the number of firms increased, 
with about 2000 firms listed by 2007.
Methodology
An event study is conducted to investigate the effect of an event on stock returns. The effect 
can be attributed to either firm-specific or economy-wide factors. The event study method has 
improved significantly over the years and has been applied in many studies. The core elements 
of this method are based in the studies of Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama Fisher, Jensen 
and Roll (1969). Parametric tests assume a normal distribution of returns, which is sometimes 
violated in certain studies. Therefore, non-parametric tests are better for detecting type 1 errors, 
or false significance. Several powerful and well-recognized non-parametric tests include those 
of Corrado (1989), Zivney and Thompson (1989) and Corrado and Zivney (1992). Correction 
for test statistics is also offered by Kolari and Pyononen (2010) to account for cross-sectional 
correlation, which improves the statistical power of the test. 
For this study, we report the results using test statistics for normal and non-normal 
probability distributions based on an event study software program, Event Study Metrics UG. 
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Both parametric and non-parametric indications are considered due to the low sample sizes on 
some of the event dates. The procedure for conducting the event study is based on MacKinlay 
(1997). The abnormal returns around the event daily dates are calculated as:
(3)   ARit = Rit - E(Rit )
where ARit are the expected abnormal returns of firm i and the E(Rit) are estimated using the 
established Market Model, which is based on the assumption of a constant and linear relation 
between individual asset returns and market return. The model accounts for each variation that 
is carried out by individual firms and is defined as:
(4)  E(Rit) = αi - βRMt + ϵit 
The parameters of the model are estimated using the ordinary least squares (OLS) equation. 
The average of the abnormal returns across all firms experiencing the event is then computed 
as the average abnormal returns, AARt, which is an accurate way of measuring the event impact 
around the time of the announcements. We tried various windows around the event dates 
and selected much shorter windows during which the results are significant. The average is 
calculated across all firms in a cross section of time from i = 1, N firms.
(5)  AARt = 1/N ∑Ni=1 Ait              
The cumulative average abnormal returns, CAAR(K,L), are also calculated across the test 
window from –K to +L window markers:
(6)  CAAR(K,L) = ∑Lt=KAARt  
The CAAR(K,L) are then tested against the significance t-tests. As for test statistics assuming a 
normal distribution of returns, we applied the classic Brown and Warner (1980) cross-sectional 
crude dependence t- test, which is robust for an event-induced variance. The cumulative 
abnormal returns are further added up across the lengths of the event windows, from day K to 
L. Variance is estimated based on the cross-section of abnormal returns, and the calculations 
are shown as follows (equation 8–12):
(7)  t = ARt/S(ARt)      
The calculation of standard error, S(ARt), of abnormal returns is as follows:
(8)      
where A* is the mean abnormal returns, which is computed as follows:
(9)    
The t-value of the cumulative average abnormal returns is
(10) t =CAAR(K,L) /S(CAAR(K,L) )         
where S(CAAR(K,L) ) could be referred to as the standard error computed by mutiplying the 
number of days by the standard deviation of abnormal returns:
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 (11)  
where, T is the number of cumulative days in the given event window and var is the variance 
of the estimated average abnormal returns at time t.
Since the common t-test is prone to cross-sectional correlation and volatility changes, we 
also compare the t-statistic to the more powerful test by Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen 
(1991). The test provides the standardized residuals with variance estimates based on the cross 
section of the event-window abnormal returns. The estimation is corrected using the more 
recent method proposed by Kolari and Pyonnonen (2010), which accounts for cross-correlation. 
Additionally, we use the Corrado (1992) rank test, which is more robust in accounting for the 
non-normal distribution of abnormal returns, which are prevalent in samples with a low number 
of observations. The non-parametric test is reported where significance is indicated. Results 
for tax events from 1991, 1993 and 2007 are presented in the next section.
FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS
The Tax Effects
We obtained data on a sample of firms including 2708 observations, and we split the data set 
according to their types: ‘A’, ‘B’, or ‘H’ share. Share ‘A’ includes the listed local Chinese 
firms with only domestic investors. Share ‘B’ includes local Chinese firm that is open to be 
purchased by foreign investors. ‘H’ shares are excluded in this study since they are not traded 
on the Shanghai exchange. In the first two law tax change events, we only report the effect on 
‘A’ share firms due to the limited availability of ‘B’ share data.
Table 1 illustrates the ‘A’ share performance during the implementation of tax law on 
Foreign Investment Enterprise (FIE) and Foreign Enterprise (FE), where we find no significant 
impact throughout the passing and issuance of the laws on 9 April 1991 and 1 July 1991, 
respectively. 
Table 1 ‘A’ Share Portfolio Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) around 1991 Tax Event 
Dates (in percentage)
  -1 to 0  0 to +1  -1 to +1 
9/4/1991 Share A 0.57 0.10 0.77
(1.131) (0.342) (1.481)
1/7/1991 Share A -0.29 0.32 -0.38
(-0.557) (1.831)* (-0.855)
The CAARs are calculated only for ‘A’ share firms due to the unavailability of Share B data at the implementation 
of tax on enterprise with foreign investment and foreign enterprise event dates. The three dates below are the 
passing of the law (9th of April, 1991), law issuance and the effective date (30th of June and 1st of July 1991). The 
30th of June is a non-trading day, and therefore the CAAR is calculated based on the following day. The sample 
size for Share A is 7, and the significance of the T-statistic is denoted under each calculated CAAR. Similar 
results are obtained using the Kolari and Pyonnonen (2010) corrected standardized cross-sectional test (Boehmer 
et al., 1991) and Corrado Rank test (1992), which account for non-normal distribution of the abnormal returns. 
Note: P-value is noted as * (<0.1), ** (<0.05) and *** (<0.01).
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The law affects foreign enterprises and local enterprises with foreign investment, imposing 
an income tax rate of 30 per cent, with an additional local income tax of 3 per cent. This 
insignificant effect is expected since most local Chinese firms are not directly affected by the 
change in the law (most have no foreign investment), and it may also be due to the many other 
tax exemptions and deductions available for these firms. Figure 1 illustrates the movement of 
CAAR across the event dates, which shows a slight decline around days -1 and 0. 
Figure 1 ‘A’ Share Portfolio Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) and CAAR around Tax Announcement 
on Enterprise Income 1991
The 1994 implementation of income tax for local Chinese firms imposed a 33 per cent 
corporate tax. We find that the ‘A’ share portfolio shows a negatively significant AAR of 0.59 
per cent on the day the law was passed (Table 2). 
Table 2  ‘A’ Share Portfolio CAARs around 1993 Tax Event Dates (in percentage)
   -1 to 0  0 to +1  -1 to +1 Others  
26/11/1993 A Share -0.01 -0.38 0.20 -0.59 0 to 0
(-0.031) (-1.118) (0.484) (-2.807)***
13/12/1993 A Share -1.72 a -1.61 -1.73 -3.10 b -3 to +3
(-6.503)*** (-6.017)*** (-5.172)*** (-5.025)***
The CAARs are calculated for ‘A’ share portfolio at the implementation of tax on local Chinese enterprise event dates. 
The two dates above are the passing of the law (26th November, 1993) and law issuance (13th December 1993). The 
sample size for ‘A’ share firms is 147, and the significance of the T-statistic is denoted under each calculated CAR. 
Similar results are obtained using the Kolari and Pyonnonen (2010) corrected standardized cross-sectional test (Boehmer 
et al., 1991) and the Corrado Rank test (1992), which accounts for non-normal distribution of the abnormal returns. 
Note: P-value is noted as * (<0.1), ** (<0.05) and *** (<0.01). Rank test also indicates a p-value of <0.05, and b p-value 
of <0.1
Following the issuance of the law on 26 November 1993, a significantly negative CAAR is 
shown across day 0 to 0. It is believed that this was the moment where the information leaked 
out to the public. A positively negative CAAR of around -3.1 per cent is observed from day 
-3 to +3 of the law issuance date. The CAAR movement can be seen in Figure 2 and Table 2, 
where ‘A’ share firms’ CAAR is moving in a negative direction immediately after the issuance 
of the tax law on 13 December 1993, indicating a loss of wealth due to the reintroduction 
of corporate taxation (33 per cent). Figure 2 illustrates the movement of CAAR, showing a 
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significant decline to negative 1 per cent from days 0 to 5 following the confirmation of the 
law on 13 December 1993.
Figure 2 ‘A’ Share Portfolio AARs and CAAR around Tax Announcement on Enterprise Income 1994
As for the unification of corporate tax in 2008, we find that across all dates for the ‘A’ 
share portfolio, the CAARs show highly significant positive indications. This reflects the 
positive reaction towards the corporate income tax reduction for the local Chinese firms, from 
the previous 33 per cent to 25 per cent. The CAAR was as high as 4.72 per cent (-3 to +3) 
when the tax law was announced and 3.32 per cent (-3 to +3) when the law was issued. Also, 
as expected, the ‘B’ share firms show a mildly negative reaction for all event dates. The slight 
reaction from the ‘B’ share portfolio might be partly due to the gradual increase of the tax rate 
promised by the government, which would be phased out in five years for local firms with 
foreign investment. The CAAR effect charting can be seen in Figure 3 and Table 3. 
Table 3 ‘A’ and ‘B’ Share Portfolio CARs around 2008 Tax Unification Event Dates (in percentage)
   -1 to 0  0 to +1  -1 to +1 Others  
8/3/2007 A Share 1.65 1.35 2.38 4.72  -3 to +3
(15.58)*** (12.77)*** (18.38)*** (23.87)***
B Share 0.89 -1.27 b 0.41 -3.75 a
(1.366) (-1.988)** (0.632) (-2.813)***
16/3/2007 A Share -0.47 -0.28 -0.56 3.332 -3 to +3
(-3.997)*** (-2.687)*** (-3.834)*** (16.77)***
B Share -1.50 c -0.07 -0.76 -1.26
(-4.484)*** (-0.074) (-0.9196) (-1.284)
6/12/2007 A Share 0.40 1.841 1.50 3.68  -3 to +3
(4.938)*** (22.713)*** (14.143)*** (10.342)***
B Share -0.68 -0.67 -0.93 -1.07
(-2.138)** (-2.350)** (-2.435)** (-1.337)
The CARs are calculated for ‘A’ and ‘B’ share portfolios at the revision of tax on local Chinese enterprise event 
dates. The three event dates above are the formal government announcement (8th March, 2007), passing of the law 
(16th March, 2007) and law issuance (6th December 2007). The sample size for A firms is 1444 and for B firms 
is 19, and the significance of the T-statistic is denoted under each calculated CAR. Similar results are obtained for 
B firms using the Kolari and Pyonnonen (2010) corrected standardized cross-sectional test (Boehmer et al., 1991). 
Note: P-value is noted as * (<0.1), ** (<0.05) and *** (<0.01). Standardized test indicates a p-value of <0.01, b p-value 
of <0.5, and c p-value of <0.1 
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From Figure 3 it can be seen that across all important event dates, the CAARs of ‘A’ share 
firms are moving upward, indicating a positive reaction towards the corporate income tax 
reduction. Nevertheless, the CAARs of ‘B’ share firms are showing a mildly negative trend 
during the implementation of the law, further declining after the effective date of the law on 1 
January 2008. This indicates a negative reaction towards the decision to increase the tax rate, 
although the gradual increase would be phased out over a five-year period. Thus, these price 
reactions are consistent with the positive and negative effects of tax laws on the firms. The 
effects on news disclosures are statistically significant in this capital market.
Figure 3 Portfolio CAARs around Tax Announcement on Enterprise Income 2007
Robustness Test
For each firm, we regressed the cumulative average abnormal returns for three days over the 
event date with selected variables: (1) firm risk, which is represented by standard deviation 
over 30 days of the abnormal returns, (2) firm size, which is measured by the firm’s annual 
market capitalization in millions of dollars in natural log and (3) firm’s annual debt to equity 
ratio (DE), which is measured as a percentage. These firm variables are important since they 
capture the firms’ characteristics and risk factors, which have a relative effect on the results. 
This further validates the cross-sectional results from the previous section. 
The choice of variables is based on previous literature mentioning their significance. Perez-
Quiroz and Timmerman (2000) find that firm size plays an important role in handling market 
condition. Vithessonthi and Tongurai (2015) study, along with several others (e.g. Margaritis 
and Psillaki, 2010; Cai and Zhang, 2011; Giroud, Mueller, Stomper, & Westerkamp, 2012), 
evidence that financial leverage is a potential factor affecting a firm’s returns. The standard 
Note: The CAAR figures combine event dates of 8th March, 2007 (formal government announcement) and 16th 
March, 2007 (passing of the law) since they are only separated by eight days.
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deviation accounts for a firm’s individual risk and volatility in some fundamental asset pricing 
models (Sharpe, 1964; Markowitz, 1991). The data for the variables are not available during 
the earlier period between 1991 and 1993; therefore, we could only verify the results on the 
most recent event date. 
We find that the signs on coefficients are mostly in accordance with the expected theoretical 
relations of risk, size and debt-to-equity (DE) ratio (see Table 4). Significant coefficients 
are observed on the tax announcement date for the ‘A’ share portfolio, indicating relevant 
abnormal returns following the release of new information. Positive signs are reported on 
the risk coefficient across the first two events for ‘A’ share firms, with high significance. This 
would indicate higher abnormal return given higher risk. Significantly negative signs for ‘A’ 
share firms are observed across all dates, indicating confirmation of the theory regarding the 
small firm effect. Conversely, the DE coefficient indicates mixed signs, with significant signs 
being negative. This would indicate that firms with lower debt level have advantages when 
dealing with corporate tax reduction. This result is somewhat similar to Doidge and Dyck 
(2015) finding. This is true given the obtained reduction of the tax shield.
Table 4 Regression Analysis on CAARs of China Tax Unification Law Event, 2008 (in percentage)
Date Portfolio C RISK SIZE D/E Adj R F-Stat
8/3/2007 A Share 0.2250 0.8569 -0.0304 -0.000002 0.068 3.330***
(8.144)*** (2.131)** (-8.520)*** (-4.06)***
B Share -0.1887 3.3463 0.0062 0.00001 0.161 2.154*
(-1.453) (3.033)*** (0.329) (0.5548)
16/3/2007 A Share 0.2383 0.4072 -0.0324 0.000001 0.049 24.201***
(8.739)*** (1.889)** (-8.318)*** (1.349)
B Share -0.007 -0.5858 0.0011 0.00003 0.260 3.113*
(-0.168) (-1.736)* (0.1661) (5.833)***
6/12/2007 A Share 0.2539 0.0009 -0.033 0.000001 0.043 20.965***
(9.422)*** (0.005) (-8.386)*** (1.413)
B Share -0.0152 0.9043 -0.0019 -0.00002 0.269 3.209*
(-0.503) (2.607)** (-0.392) (-2.412)**
For the robustness test, some independent variables are regressed against cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAAR) as the dependent variable. Variables included in this regression are the standard deviation 
of abnormal returns (firm risk), market capitalization (size) and debt-to-equity (leverage) ratio for each 
firm. This regression uses white heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance as in Eviews. 
Note: P-value is indicated by * (0.1), ** (0.05) and *** (0.01).
Nevertheless, the ‘B’ share firms result is not as strong. The coefficient of risk is in line 
with the theory, with the more significant signs being positive. Firm size and debt ratio show 
mixed results, most likely due to the low number of observations. 
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CONCLUSION
This paper provides evidence on how corporate income tax changes directly affect the share 
prices in China, which is a very important emerging market. This study deserves attention 
due to the significance of tax policy impacts on firm values in such a large economy. The 
result is not consistent with the classic Modigliani and Miller (1963) theory on the relevance 
of corporate tax to firm value, which claims that there is tax deductibility for interest income 
leading to tax shield value gains. In fact, the result indicates that the firms create value from 
the total tax savings as a result of the tax reduction (as evidenced by the 2007 tax event) but 
also lose value following the re-introduction of tax (as evidenced by the 1993 tax event). We 
find that the 1993 tax event negatively affected local Chinese firms by decreasing their cash 
flows, a result of the new 33 per cent tax rate. Nevertheless, the unification of corporate tax in 
2007 at a lower tax rate for local firms and at a higher tax for firms with foreign investment 
had different effects. The local Chinese firms were positively affected because the reduced 
tax increased their cash flows. However, there was a negative effect on the firms with foreign 
investment, although the effect was mild, likely because the increase in the tax rate was to 
be phased out over a five-year period. This finding is also similar to Chang, Chen and Chen 
(2017) on Taiwan sample. 
Additionally, the study finds that the Chinese market is fairly efficient in pricing equity. 
The market promptly reacted to the value-changing tax policy. Indeed, most significant impacts 
are found within one to three days of the event date, despite the control of information and the 
media by the government. These results are new, but they support tax effect theories. Given 
the size of the Chinese economy and the impact tax laws would have had, these findings 
contribute to the growing literature on corporate finance, and taxation policy, as revealed in 
tests of this market.
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APPENDICES
Table A1 China GDP and Tax Revenue
Note: Data collected from World Bank database and China State Administration of Taxation website (http://www.chinatax.
gov.cn/eng/).
Table A2 Related Event Dates Regarding Changes in Enterprise/Corporate Tax in China
Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and 
Foreign Enterprises (This includes foreign companies, enterprises with foreign investment, enterprises 
and other economic organizations that either have establishments or locations in China or have 
income from sources within China)
09/04/1991 Passed during the Forth Plenary Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress 
of the PRC
30/06/1991 Issued by the State Council 
01/07/1991 Effective date of the tax law 
Interim Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Enterprise Income Tax (Include any state-
owned, collective, private, joint operation and joint equity enterprise)
26/11/1993 Passed during the 12th General Meeting of the State Council 
13/12/1993 Issued by the State Council
01/01/1994 Effective date of the tax law
Law of the People’s Republic of China on Enterprise Income Tax (All resident and non-resident 
companies are taxed at 25 per cent, except for a few that have special status, including high-tech 
and other firms)
08/03/2007 Explanation of the Draft Enterprise Income Tax Law, delivered by Finance Minister 
Jin Renqing
16/03/2007 Passed during the Fifth Plenary Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress 
of the PRC
06/12/2007 Issued by the State Council 
01/01/2008 Effective date of the tax law
